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Indissolubility and Second Marriage – A New Way Out of the Impasse?   
 
 
The German systematic theologian Thomas Ruster argues in this issue of the INTAMS 
review that the time has come for the Roman Catholic Church to give up on two central pieces 
of its teaching on Christian marriage. The first one is the assumption that marriage is a natural 
institution, established by the divine creator and subject to natural and divine laws, which 
remains the same in the face of changing historical and cultural contexts and as such also 
provides the inalienable bedrock and substrate for Christian sacramental marriage. The 1983 
Code of Canon Law puts it this way: “The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a 
woman establish between themselves a partnership of the whole of life and which is ordered 
by its nature to the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring, has 
been raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament between the baptized” (can. 1055 
§1). The second position contested by Ruster is what canonical and theological handbooks on 
marriage refer to as the “identity of contract and sacrament”. It has also been codified in the 
church’s marriage law and is expressed in the subsequent paragraph of the canon just quoted: 
“For this reason, a valid matrimonial contract cannot exist between the baptized without it 
being by that fact a sacrament” (can. 1055 §2).  
 Ruster’s critique of the second supposition is not so new and does not therefore come 
as a surprise. That baptized Christians cannot validly enter marriage without their consent 
being automatically a sacrament is a theological conclusion that did convince a majority of 
scholars from the Middle Ages up to modern times, but by far not all of them. Their reasons 
for dissent varied in the course of time – with some referring to scholastic reflections on what 
constitutes a sacrament while others argued on the basis of the theology of grace –, but they 
all in some way concurred in the conviction that to raise marriage to the dignity of a 
sacrament more is required than the juridical act of two consenting partners, that “more” 
being the explicit intention of the spouses to receive the sacrament or the sacramental blessing 
of the union by an officially mandated minister. Moreover, it is commonly assumed that the 
popes of the 19
th
 century who inculcated the inseparability of contract and sacrament did so 
for political rather than theological reasons, namely to refute the modern states’ claim on civil 
marriage and to defend the church’s jurisdiction in matters of matrimony. In the more recent 
past the critique of an automatism which renders the marital vows of baptized partners eo ipso 
into a sacrament has again gained momentum, mainly because of the growing number of 
“nominal Christians” in western societies who according to the church’s position can only 
have sacramental or otherwise invalid marriages although they often have no idea of what the 
marital sacrament means, let alone consciously agree to or seek the sacramental character of 
their union. Renowned canonists like L. Örsy have therefore suggested that “the church needs 
to find some way of recognizing the natural marriages of baptized unbelievers” and that “[t]he 
possibility of such recognition would also open the way for a dignified refusal of the 
sacrament when a baptized person clearly professes unbelief” (L. ÖRSY: Marriage in Canon 
Law: Texts and Comments, Reflections and Questions, Glazier: Collegeville, 1986, 270; cf. 
also S. DEMEL: Kirchliche Trauung - unerläßliche Pflicht für die Ehe des katholischen 
Christen?, Stuttgart etc.: Kohlhammer, 1993). They were backed by theologians who argued 
that “[m]arriage becomes a sacrament, not because of some juridical effect of baptism, but 
because of the active faith of the couple” so much so that “[t]hose who marry without active 
Christian faith, be they ever so baptized, marry also without Christian sacrament” (M.G. 
LAWLER: “Faith, Contract, and Sacrament in Christian Marriage”, in: M.G. LAWLER/W.P. 
ROBERTS [eds.]: Christian Marriage and Family: Contemporary Theological and Pastoral 
Perspectives, Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1996, 46; cf. also the monograph by J.B. 
SEQUEIRA: Tout mariage entre baptisés est-il nécessairement sacramentel? Étude historique, 
théologique et canonique sur le lien entre baptême et mariage, Paris: Cerf, 1985). From a 
pastoral perspective as well, the separation between valid and sacramental marriages seemed 
to offer new possibilities for a marriage catechumenate in the course of which unbelieving 
couples could be invited to have a non-sacramental wedding ritual in church to be eventually 
followed, after an adequate initiation into the faith, by a full-fledged sacramental celebration 
(cf. H. DENIS [ed.]: Le mariage, un sacrement pour les croyants?, Paris: Cerf, 
2
1990). 
 Ruster’s advance, however, does not aim first of all at addressing the case of 
unbelieving baptized couples and of sacramental practice. His intention is to provide a 
solution for the tricky issue of the remarried divorced people in the church. His suggestion is 
simple and straightforward: If the Church would distinguish between sacramental and non-
sacramental marriages for baptized Christians, the way would be open to recognize second 
marriages after divorce as what they are perceived to be by those concerned and by most of 
their contemporaries: factual unions which may realize a higher or lower degree of moral 
integrity but which in any case would not fall into the realm of the Church’s teaching 
authority and normative moral judgement. In all this, the indissoluble character of the first 
marriage would be warranted since remarriage would in no way put into question, let alone 
dissolve, the previous marital bond. Ruster is uncompromising when it comes to defending 
the indissolubility of Christian marriage which he regards as the inalienable centre of Jesus’ 
teaching on marriage. Therefore he does not argue – as some other proponents of the 
separability of contract and sacrament have done before him – that marriages should be 
(regarded as) dissoluble when the spouses lack faith and thus an adequate disposition for the 
sacrament. The logic of annulment is for Ruster as questionable as the Church’s 
undifferentiated culpabilization of Christians whose marriages have failed on the human level. 
Both are the result of an inadequate approach to relational difficulties and failure since the 
Church is stuck between two unhealthy alternatives if the marriage has come to an end – 
either look for a defect at the time of its coming into existence or otherwise blame the couple 
for not living up to the demands of a union that is supposed to mirror Christ’s unfailing 
faithfulness toward the Church. Ruster does not hesitate to carry his line of argument as far as 
to imply that the indissolubility of Christian marriage is not a moral obligation that is either to 
be met or infringed upon but rather a simple matter of fact and reality. Because Christian 
marriage simply cannot be dissolved, a second marriage is by definition “something else”, a 
new relationship that simply does not compete with the first one and therefore should be 
accepted and recognized as such.  
 The reader of Ruster’s article will probably be left with a number of perplexing 
questions. Does asserting the indissolubility of Christian marriage in such a categorical way 
not amount to recuperating the idea of an ontological bond which mainstream post-Vatican II 
theology has replaced by, or at least reinterpreted in terms of, a personalist approach to the 
conjugal union? Will the clear distinction between sacramental and non-sacramental marriage 
not elevate Christian marriage to such a high ideal that only a small elite of Christian couples 
will be able to live up to its claims of sacramentality and indissolubility? And what if such 
marriages break up as they obviously do? Will the persons concerned and the church 
community as a whole share the vision that a subsequent relationship would in no way impair 
the indissoluble character of the first marriage because they simply do not compare? Ruster 
has elaborated on these and other questions in much more detail in the German book which he 
has recently co-authored with his wife who works as a marriage counsellor (THOMAS & HEIDI 
RUSTER: …bis dass der Tod euch scheidet? Die Unauflöslichkeit der Ehe und die 
wiederverheirateten Geschiedenen. Ein Lösungsvorschlag, München: Kösel, 2013). It turns 
out here that the real “revolutionary” potential, as Ruster calls it himself, of his proposal lies 
in his denying of the Church’s teaching and moral authority over the “nature” of marriage, or 
to put it differently, over “natural marriage”. The theological hermeneutics which derives 
from this claim has a double effect: It allows Ruster on the one hand to have an ingenuous and 
unprejudiced view of the plurality of today’s living arrangements, of which second marriages 
are just one expression. The pure fact of that diversity and pluriformity is referred to as a 
compelling counterevidence against the traditional theological supposition that “natural 
marriage” has been established in creation as a normative framework for sexual relations 
which the Church is called to uphold before talking about sacramental marriage. Thus, 
Ruster’s approach to second marriages provides church and theology almost in passing with a 
recipe to adapt its ethical discourse to the contemporary relationship culture.  
 On the other hand, however, one gets the impression that once the link between 
natural and sacramental marriage has been broken, the theological discourse on marriage 
regains freshness and originality, especially when it comes to the specificity and uniqueness 
of its sacramental character. The fact that in today’s culture sacramental and indissoluble 
marriage “stands there, alone and naked” (ibid. 33) is for Ruster not a reason to despair and 
withdraw but rather to discover it afresh as a “configuration of God’s Kingdom” (84). Such 
sacramentality is a gift of the Kingdom and not the result of the spouses’ commitment and 
endeavour; but still, it is not beyond the realm of inner-worldly experience either. In this way 
indissolubility does not remain an abstract theological construct or juridical clause but 
penetrates into the couples’ consciousness and experience; as Ruster puts it in his English 
article: “a marriage can only be indissoluble if it IS indissoluble, that is, if during all crises 
and challenges both partners know that their union cannot be destroyed” (my emphasis). Such 
marriage would be indissoluble indeed – a foretaste of the Kingdom to which Jesus was 
referring marriage. For the time being, however, we have to live and to cope with divorce and 
second marriages. For that purpose, Ruster offers a radical and thought-provoking 
contribution. 
 
